The problem
Even from his self-imposed exile, Nietzsche was constantly attuned to the condition of his time. And he did not like what he saw. From his vantage point, Western culture was riddled with spiritual illness. Like other critics, he attacked the mediocrity and pettiness of his day. But Nietzsche was not simply another disaffected intellectual. His criticisms are rooted in a careful study of history. Nietzsche sees Western history as the gradual spread of decadence. Values we usually accept without question, and often embrace -such as equality, altruism, progress and humanistic morality -have a contemptible origin. They arise from weakness. The fact that we accept them uncritically -they are so prevalent in our thoughts as to be nearly invisible, as water is to a fish -is a symptom of the advanced state of our disease.
For Nietzsche, the growing decadence means that baseness rules. This thought revolted him, but his greater concern was the impact it would have on the future. He fretted that the spread of sickness would eliminate the human capacity for greatness. Zarathustra expresses this concern when speaking to the crowd in the market: 'The time has come for man to set himself a goal. The time has come for man to plant the seed of his highest hope. His soil is still rich enough. But one day this soil will be poor and domesticated, and no tall tree will be able to grow in it' (Z P 5). 1 And Nietzsche tells us that the advent of a humanity incapable of excellence is closer than we would like to think:
The overall degeneration of man down to what today appears to the socialist dolts and flatheads as their 'man of the future' -as their ideal -this degeneration and diminution of man into the perfect herd animal (or, as they say, to the man of the 'free society'), this animalization of man into the dwarf animal of equal rights and claims, is possible, there is no doubt about it. (BGE 203) The values at the core of our civilization, of which we are so proud, could mean the end of human greatness. The soul of our culture is rotten.
This event is a disaster because of its link to nihilism. Meaning and value are essential to human life, so much so that Zarathustra describes man as 'the esteemer' (Z 'On the Thousand and One Goals'). And mankind finds its value and meaning in its highest specimens (UM II 9). Yet we seem to be losing the capacity to produce such exemplars. We can give birth only to mediocrity. Concomitant with this is a rise in meaninglessness, an expansion of nihilism, an increased perception that life has no purpose or value. Without a new source of meaningwithout, that is, a new nobility -humanity will wither. If the situation does not change, we are likely to cast ourselves into a suicidal abyss.
Nietzsche offers a potential solution to this terrifying problem. Exceptional human beings must create new values and embody excellence, thereby instigating a new era: 'O my brothers, I dedicate and direct you to a new nobility: you shall become procreators and cultivators and sowers of the future' (Z 'On Old and New Tablets' 12). The new values will echo the brilliant souls of higher people. All philosophy is a reflection of one's character (BGE 6), so the value creation of a new nobility will incorporate their virtuosity. The result will be the fostering of 'a new greatness of man' (BGE 212). Nietzsche is a pivotal figure because he anticipates and assists the new nobility of the future. This is a decidedly political task because it involves a vision of the future path of humanity. As Daniel Conway notes, Nietzsche returns to the founding question of political philosophy: what shall mankind become? 2 Nietzsche's philosophers of the future will be political actors in the grand sense: they will shape culture and society through the values they create. 3 The revaluation is an essential task for the health of Western culture.
But there is a potentially insuperable problem with this solution. In the late modern age, higher men are themselves decadent, and it is possible that they cannot rise to the level of excellence of earlier ages. Parts of Nietzsche's texts suggest this. Two of Nietzsche's heroes from the latter parts of the modern age, Napoleon and Goethe, both succumbed in the end to the pettiness of nationalism (BGE 256) . And especially in the works of 1888, Nietzsche frequently describes himself as sick with the illness of his day. In his autobiography, he writes that 'I have a subtler sense of smell for the signs of ascent and descent than any other human being before me; I am the teacher par excellence for this -I know both, I am both' (EH 'Wise' 1) and says that 'I am, no less than Wagner, a child of this time; that is, a decadent' (CW P). Since he regarded himself as a seminal figure, admissions of his own illness suggest that even the mightiest are disease-ridden in the twilight of the idols.
The illness of even the highest people might mean that no new nobility can be created. If those who would create new values are complicit in the sickness of the day, they may not be able to create anything but infected values. Their souls might be too corrupted. Is this problem fatal? If the highest souls are irredeemably ill, then modernity cannot be salvaged from within. 4 Only the collapse of modernity, followed by the rise of a healthier culture, could overcome our illness (and this might be impossible). On the other hand, it is possible that exceptional figures like Nietzsche can overcome their sickness and then help to cure our culture. 5 Nietzsche himself suggests this when he writes that he resisted and overcame his own decadence (CW P). 6 In the rest of this article, I will argue for a position between the two The concept underlying Nietzsche's view of health is power. The will to power is the driving and fundamental force of all life: we all strive to expend as much power as possible. Therefore, power becomes the standard of value. Nietzsche is quite explicit about this: 'What is good? -All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man. What is bad? -All that proceeds from weakness' (A 2). The highest level of power is spiritual power, power over oneself. While physical domination is an expression of the will to power, it is a lowlevel one compared with power over oneself. The asceticism of the saint, for example, requires much more power than the violence of the barbarian. The most admirable human beings are those who master the chaos within, not those who simply dominate others.
This view of power forms the basis of Nietzsche's conception of health. A healthy individual is a powerful one. The strong of the first essay of the Genealogy, for example, are frequently described in terms of vigor: 'The knightly-aristocratic value judgments presupposed a powerful physicality, a flourishing, abundant, even overflowing, health' (GM I 7). Figures whom Nietzsche admires are also called healthy; for example, he describes Cesare Borgia as one of 'these healthiest of all tropical monsters and growths ' (BGE 197) . A sick individual, on the other hand, is weak. This becomes most clear in the third essay of the Genealogy where Nietzsche writes: 'wherever the ascetic priest [an embodiment of weakness] has prevailed with this treatment, sickness has spread in depth and breadth with astonishing speed' (GM III 21). The strong should be separated from the weak so that they are not infected (GM III 14) .
It is clear that health for Nietzsche is a reflection of one's level of power. The healthiest people are the most powerful. Disease, then, is weakness. The masses are ill because they are weak; they are not capable of strength and health. To describe higher individuals -himself included -as decadent is thus a jarring statement. It means that they have some element of frailty within their souls. How can this be? In the rest of the article, I examine how one can be both strong and weak, both healthy and sick.
Intermingling of health and sickness
On the Genealogy of Morals explores the foundations of the moral code that would dominate the Western world (if not the entire world) for at least two millennia. By examining the archetypal kinds of human beings and the values they create, Nietzsche seeks to understand how we became what we are. 7 His analysis of health and sickness in the Genealogy gets at the heart of the issue. Therefore, I focus my analysis on that text. We see that even in the earliest days of civilization, the strong were infected with the spiritual diseases of slave morality and bad conscience. Decadence and disease in the souls of the elites are not new phenomena; they have existed since we became truly human beings.
In the first essay of the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche describes two groups of people, one of which he generally views positively and one of which he generally views negatively. The first group is usually referred to as the masters, while the second is usually termed the slaves. The defining difference between the groups is their health, which is rooted in differing power levels. The masters are praised as being healthy exemplars of humanity. They overflow with puissance and therefore possess 'a powerful physicality, a flourishing, abundant, even overflowing health' (GM I 7). The masters are warriors, constantly seeking to outdo each other by challenging themselves and demonstrating their martial virtues. They embody health and plenitude, and they embrace life wholeheartedly. The slaves, on the other hand, are called weak and ill-constituted and therefore represent declining and inferior forms of life. They are hostile to life because they are weak. Simple survival is a 104 Philosophy & Social Criticism 27 (2) tremendous effort for them, and they are therefore weary of the world and of life. They wish the world to be other than it is. In a famous image, Nietzsche compares the slaves with lambs because of their feebleness; they are passive beings always at risk in a hostile environment. The slaves fiercely resent the masters. They too wish to be strong, but are capable only of weakness and mediocrity. Therefore, they lash out at the masters, seeking to destroy them. These groups portray in an archetypal fashion the two sorts of human being, the healthy and the sick. The dynamic of their relationship has tremendous repercussions for the history of Western culture.
Each group creates its own value system based on its way of life. Out of their vitality and health, the masters create a moral code that praises power and martial valor. The creation of master morality is a positive act: the masters affirm what they are, calling themselves 'good'. Those who cannot exercise such strength are termed 'bad', considered beneath notice. The slaves, on the other hand, begin their value creation by negating. Because they are frequently victimized by the masters, the slaves label all that arises from strength 'evil'. Plenitude, vitality and arrogance are slandered. The qualities of the slaves -meekness, peacefulness and compassion -are termed 'good' as an afterthought. The idea of free will also arises from slave morality in order to portray the slaves as morally superior: the slaves argue that they follow these dictates out of choice, not out of necessity.
The two value systems fundamentally conflict because what is good for one group is harmful to the other. The overflowing vitality of the masters leads them to acts of violence, and the slaves are usually their victims. To protect themselves, then, the slaves demand that the masters embrace the code of good and evil. Nietzsche terms the campaign to make the values of weakness universal 'the slave revolt in morals'. The masters, however, cannot live according to their nature if they are shackled by slave morals. Those morals deny precisely the qualities definitive of elevation. Therefore, the two codes battle each other: 'The two opposing values "good and bad," "good and evil" have been engaged in a fearful struggle on earth for thousands of years' (GM I 16). In general the slaves have won; the code of good and evil has been largely triumphant. This victory is most obvious in the spread of Christianity, but Nietzsche also sees it in the growth of democracy and the socialist movement, as well as lurking in the recesses of science.
What is interesting about Nietzsche's account, however, is that it is not dichotomous. The account sketched above suggests that the two types of human being, and their respective values, are mutually exclusive, but this is not the case. As the slave revolt in morals triumphs, it infects the masters with its values. The strong now bow before the values of weakness. But the strong do not simply become meek, nor do they merely feign obedience. Instead, their souls become battlegrounds for the struggle between the two codes. It is precisely this internal conflict that marks them as higher beings:
One might even say that it [the conflict between the two codes] has risen even higher and thus become more profound and spiritual: so that today there is perhaps no more decisive mark of a 'higher nature,' a more spiritual nature, than that of being divided in this sense and a genuine battleground of these opposed values. (GM I 16) The early masters are unreflective, instinctive beings. The infection of slave values makes the masters more than just violent beasts. For the first time, they become human: their souls expand and they acquire a consciousness previously unknown. Therefore, Nietzsche notes that 'it is only fair to add that it was on the soil of this essentially dangerous form of human existence, the priestly form, that man first became an interesting animal, that only here did the human soul in a higher sense acquire depth and become evil' (GM I 6).
Nietzsche continues with the theme of the infection of the masters in the second essay of the Genealogy, which explores the creation of two forms of the conscience, one good and one bad. The good conscience is the faculty which allows us to regulate ourselves and therefore to make promises. The man able to make promises, the sovereign individual, is described in glowing terms:
This emancipated individual, with the actual right to make promises, this master of a free will, this sovereign man -how should he not be aware of his superiority over all those who lack the right to make promises and stand as their own guarantors, of how much trust, how much fear, how much reverence he arouses -he 'deserves' all three. (GM II 2) Given Nietzsche's praise for both types, a question immediately arises: is the sovereign individual the same figure as the master of the first essay? The answer is clearly no. The master is a creature of instinct, of powerful drives. Because of this, the master is short-sighted; he forgets. He is impulsive, acting as soon as the inclination arises. For example, the master is not poisoned by resentment because he immediately discharges the emotion, and then moves on to other things, forgetting the incident which caused resentment in the first place (GM I 10). The sovereign individual, on the other hand, has overcome the human inclination to forgetfulness and, through severe self-control, dominates his instincts and thereby makes himself predictable and calculable. The conscience is created through the infliction of great pain in order to instill memory forcibly into the individual (GM II 3). The master of the first essay must undergo a significant change -he must acquire self-control and foresight -if he is to become a sovereign individual. 8 What is it that prompts the master to undergo such a significant 106 Philosophy & Social Criticism 27 (2) change? Nothing other than the victory of slave morality over master morality, as described at the end of the first essay. A key component of slave morality is the free will, the idea that individuals are responsible for their actions -they could have acted differently had they chosen to do so. Free will and responsibility particularly apply to the masters, who are the hostile targets of slave morality: 'just as the popular mind separates the lightning from its flash and takes the latter for an action . . . so popular morality also separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum behind the strong man, which was free to express strength or not to do so' (GM I 13; cf. BGE 32). Being accountable for one's actions is exactly the defining characteristic of the sovereign individual. Such a person has 'mastery over himself' (GM II 2) and is 'able to stand security for his own future' (GM II 1). The master of the first essay is incapable of this. He must acquire a memory. The sovereign individual, then, is a strong individual who lives in an era in which slave morality predominates. He emerges with the victory of the slaves only when moral responsibility is required. The sovereign individual is thus a result of the intermingling of health and sickness within the soul of the higher person. What about the bad conscience? Again, its origin is connected to the victory of slave morality. Nietzsche tells us that the bad conscience arose when man 'found himself finally enclosed within the walls of society and of peace' (GM II 16). Society cannot tolerate the external discharge of instincts because it seeks to preserve its members from danger. Whom does society benefit most? The slaves. The masters are creatures of strong instinct, and frequently need to discharge these instincts in 'a disgusting procession of murder, arson, rape, and torture' (GM I 11). A strongly regulated society limits the masters by demanding that they refrain from violence, even against those weaker than themselves. The slaves, on the other hand, struggle to survive, and need the collective power of society to protect them. Society therefore cannot tolerate the violent discharges of the masters; such instincts must be internalized. The bad conscience therefore also emerges from the victory of the slaves. 9 Since both forms of the conscience arise from the victory of the slaves, what is the relationship between the two? The two forms seem to be different manifestations of the same phenomenon. The similarities are apparent. Both involve great violence: pain is needed to create memory, and the internalization of the instincts leads to great suffering. More to the point, both involve the turning inward of instincts. This is clear for the bad conscience -it is its defining feature -but it is also the case with the good conscience. How can one acquire the ability to make promises, to be accountable? By turning certain instincts inward in order to dominate other drives. In Section 113 of Daybreak (1982), Nietzsche is clear that the self-control of the ascetic represents the internalization of the violent instincts of the barbarian. Self-control and responsibility arise from the internalization of instincts. Section eighteen of the second essay makes a similar point. It equates the bad conscience in the strong with the creation of self-mastery. Much of the language is quite similar to the discussion of the origin of the sovereign individual; for example, he describes the internalization of the instincts as 'burning in a will' and 'imposing a form upon oneself'. It seems, then, that the forms of conscience are two sides of the same coin. They are different but related outcomes of the same event, the triumph of slave morality. And they both appear in the strong individual.
Health and sickness, then, are not mutually exclusive categories. They coexist within the same person -one can display elements of both strength and weakness. Indeed, they must coexist if a truly higher being is to exist. The sovereign individual displays the calculability and responsibility demanded of slave morality even though he is a powerful individual. And Nietzsche highly praises this type. Therefore, the feature which marks the superiority of the sovereign individual is the result of an infection. What is significant about this is that the infection of the masters with elements of the slave principle happens in the earliest days of civilization. The events of the first essay seem to have occurred before the creation of a significantly differentiated society. Presumably, it occurred during very early and primitive tribal cultures. The second essay explicitly recounts the founding of an enclosed and articulated civilization. The sickness of the higher man is not a recent development. It has existed since the dawn of civilization. And Nietzsche's account of spiritual illness suggests that it can never be fully cured. He speaks of overcoming one's sickness, not ridding oneself of it. In describing himself, for example, he states not that he destroyed the infection, but that 'I resisted it' (CW P). And his references to his disease in Ecce Homo are in the present tense, not the past. Given the immense stature he claims for himself in that work, the fact that he does not claim to have completely cured himself is suggestive. Since we cannot overcome our infection, we must constantly battle with it. The struggle with decadence is an ongoing one. 10 One could argue that humanity has almost always been infected, but the disease has become progressively worse. According to this view, there is something distinct about the higher men of the twilight of the idols. Because they are more diseased now, they are significantly different. But Nietzsche indicates otherwise in the Genealogy. The creation of the conscience is described in horrific terms, suggesting that the infection was just as severe then as now: 'thus began the gravest and uncanniest illness, from which humanity has not yet recovered, man's suffering of man, of himself' (GM II 16). There is no indication that the 108 Philosophy & Social Criticism 27 (2) disease has worsened. 11 And the suffering Nietzsche attributes to the disease of the bad conscience is not tied to any era, but is part and parcel of the infection. While the specific manifestations of the illness may change (particularly its prevalence and role within society), it is apparent that the sickness of late modernity is not a special case. 12
The benefits of sickness
The infection of humanity, even of its highest exemplars, is harmful. Disease is always dangerous as it can potentially kill the patient. Perhaps worse, from Nietzsche's point of view, is the fact that genius can be corrupted through such infection. Pascal -a brilliant thinker who betrayed his greatness in order to embrace Christianity -stands as an object lesson of the dangers of the illness. If this were the complete story, then any hope for greatness would be futile: if illness is exclusively harmful, then nothing could be done to salvage mankind. But Nietzsche argues that infection is not wholly bad; it actually serves a beneficial purpose. While even the mightiest may fail because of spiritual ailment, disease can also serve life in two ways. First, somewhat paradoxically, it can act as an incentive to life: the challenge it poses can entice the strong to seek to overcome it. Second, the disease of the bad conscience and slave morality improves mankind by elevating us from mere beasts to spiritual beings. Surprisingly, this means that sickness is necessary if one is to achieve truly great deeds.
For Nietzsche, life is about self-overcoming. Life whispers this secret to Zarathustra: 'And life itself confided this secret to me: "Behold," it said, "I am that which must always overcome itself" ' (Z 'On SelfOvercoming'). We always seek to move past what we are in order to become something greater. Life, therefore, is about struggle with oneself -one must fight an internal battle in order to move beyond what one is now. Nietzsche claims that the way to judge the level of a person's elevation is by looking at what that person must overcome:
The strength of those who attack can be measured in a way by the opposition they require: every growth is indicated by the search for a mighty opponent -or problem; for a warlike philosopher challenges tasks, too, to single combat. The task is not simply to master what happens, but what requires us to stake all our strength, suppleness, and fighting skill. (EH 'Wise' 7).
The mightiest seek out great challenges to prove themselves. 13 The bad conscience offers a tremendous challenge to even the mightiest individual. By resisting and overcoming something as mighty as the predominant sickness of mankind, the strong person grows and develops into something new. The struggle brings on a change as the individual learns and develops from the experience. It is for this reason that Nietzsche writes '[w]hat does not kill me makes me stronger' (TI 'Maxims' 8). He gives an autobiographical account of this in section four of the 1886 preface to The Gay Science:
In the end, lest what is most important remain unsaid: from such abysses, from such severe sickness, also from the sickness of severe suspicion, one returns newborn, having shed one's skin, more ticklish and malicious, with a more delicate taste for joy, with a tenderer tongue for all good things, with merrier senses, with a second dangerous innocence in joy, more childlike and yet, a hundred times subtler than one has ever been before.
The challenge of fighting with the illness within one's soul offers an unmatched opportunity for self-overcoming. 14 It is for this reason that Nietzsche expresses gratitude to his ailments in Ecce Homo. Without them, he would not have become who he was, he would not have experienced illness as 'an energetic stimulus for life, for living more' (EH 'Wise' 2). And Nietzsche is not alone in this gratitude. He offers other examples of the same phenomenon. Ethnic interbreeding, he writes, can make one weak and ill because it produces multiple conflicting drives within oneself. But the strongest use this internal strife as an enticement to life: 'But when the opposition and war in such a nature have the effect of one more charm and incentive to life . . . then those magical, incomprehensible, and unfathomable ones arise, those enigmatic men predestined for victory and seduction, whose most beautiful expression is found in Alcibiades and Caesar' (BGE 200). 15 Health, then, is not something that one has, a possession. It is a struggle, a process, in which one constantly overcomes oneself and one's infirmities to become something greater. It seems likely that even the highest man will never be able to completely cure himself; it also seems likely that he would not wish to. The fight against one's illness is a strong incentive to life, not a debilitating condition. This is the meaning of the term 'great health', which Nietzsche describes as follows: 'that one does not merely have but also acquires continually, and must acquire because one gives it up again and again, and must give it up' (GS 382). Nietzsche even uses the term 'great health' to describe those who can create new values (GM II 24), clearly alluding to the same idea. 16 Sickness serves a positive function by presenting a mighty opponent against which one must struggle.
But there is more to the story. The infection of slave values and the bad conscience change the very nature of humanity. Nietzsche writes that with the introduction of the bad conscience 'the aspect of the earth was essentially altered' (GM II 16). The significant alteration was the 110 Philosophy & Social Criticism 27 (2) creation of the soul, of a rich and varied internal landscape. Slave morality demands an inner consciousness that master morality does not. Master morality springs from instinct and exuberance, while slave morality arises from the careful reaction of the slaves to a hostile world. Similarly, the conscience necessitates self-consciousness and self-control. Both, therefore, require a soul, an awareness and control of the drives and affects of one's internal world. The victory of slave morality and the bad conscience therefore are responsible for the creation of the soul. Nietzsche is quite explicit about this:
All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward -this is what I call the internalization of man: thus it was that man first developed what was later called his 'soul.' The entire inner world, originally as thin as if it were stretched between two membranes, expanded and extended itself, acquired depth, breadth, and height, in the same measure as outward discharge was inhibited. (GM II 16) Humanity rises above other animals through the creation of the soul, and it owes this defining feature to its spiritual ailment.
It is for this reason that Nietzsche describes the bad conscience as 'an illness, there is no doubt about that, but an illness as pregnancy is an illness ' (GM II 19) . With the rise of bad conscience, humanity has an entirely new level of existence. This is of particular interest to the strong because it gives them a new domain in which to express their plenitude, a new wilderness to explore and conquer. Only now is spiritual activity possible. Nietzsche is clear that spiritual power ranks above physical power -any brute can exercise physical power over another, but only a rare being like the saint or the philosopher can achieve spiritual greatness. 17 Therefore, the highest human specimens are possible only after the creation of the bad conscience. A figure like Goethe, whom Nietzsche greatly admired, could not have existed without the spiritual infection.
Indeed, in some passages Nietzsche seems to think that infection is required for the highest forms of greatness to emerge, and that only the strong who fall prey to poison like the ascetic ideal and the bad conscience can undertake the greatest of tasks, the creation of new values. 18 In section ten of the third essay of the Genealogy, Nietzsche makes this point emphatically:
I recall the story of King Vishvamitra, who through millennia of self-torture acquired such a feeling of power and self-confidence that he endeavored to build a new heaven -the uncanny symbol of the most ancient and most recent experience of philosophers on earth: whoever has at some time built a 'new heaven' has found the power to do so only in his own hell.
A crucial passage from Beyond Good and Evil makes the same point:
111 Glenn: The great health
The discipline of suffering, of great suffering -do you not know that only this discipline has created all enhancements of man so far? That tension of the soul in unhappiness which cultivates its strength, its shudders face to face with great ruin, its inventiveness and courage in enduring, persevering, interpreting, and exploiting suffering, and whatever has been granted to it of profundity, secret, mask, spirit, cunning, greatness -was it not granted to it through suffering, through the discipline of great suffering? (BGE 225) Since new forms of greatness are the goal, embodied most fully in the creation of new values (the highest task), 19 it seems that illness is not an obstacle to the highest achievements. Rather, it is essential to it. Without spiritual disease and suffering, man could never rise above the animals. Ironically, then, the defeat of the masters of the early parts of the Genealogy is a necessary precondition for the existence of the highest beings.
The same point is made in another passage in the Genealogy. In section thirteen of the third essay, Nietzsche describes the strange logic behind the ascetic ideal, an attempt by the ill-constituted to cope with the pain caused by the bad conscience. In describing the need for such palliatives, he describes humanity as 'more sick, uncertain, changeable, indeterminate than any other animal, there is no doubt about it -he is the sick animal'. But he is not just speaking of the latter-day slave here; he is describing mankind in general. If anything, he is describing the strong more than the weak. Immediately after this description, he makes a key point:
Certainly he has also dared more, done more new things, braved and challenged fate more than all the other animals put together; he, the great experimenter with himself, discontented and insatiable, wrestling with animals, nature, and gods for ultimate dominion . . . how should such a courageous and richly endowed animal not also be the most imperilled, the most chronically and profoundly sick of all sick animals?
The deeds he attributes to humanity are clearly deeds of strength. And they are intertwined with sickness.
These passages indicate that disease is a prerequisite for the highest spiritual accomplishments. Instead of debilitating would-be higher men, making them capable of only limited deeds, illness allows them to aspire to the highest deeds. It is clear that the spiritual infirmities described in the Genealogy have the potential to destroy one who seeks to walk the path of greatness. There is no doubt that sickness is dangerous. But Nietzsche's judgment is not one-dimensional. Illness is both good and bad. 20 It is a constant danger because it could lead one to forsake the path of greatness. But it is also the foundation upon which spiritual elevation can be built. Life is served by the victory of slave values and the bad conscience. 21 112 Philosophy & Social Criticism 27 (2)
Conclusion: an uncertain future
Nietzsche's understanding of the creation of values is grounded in the soul. The values one creates are a reflection of one's soul. If the souls of higher individuals today are infected with spiritual disease, their ability to create the values needed for a new era of nobility is suspect. Their souls might inevitably betray them. The revaluation of values is necessary to overcome our decadence, but it is fraught with danger and uncertainty. Nietzsche's struggles with his own decadence show the depth of the hazards involved. It is possible that the revaluation is ultimately impossible. We might never escape the mediocrity of the modern age. Or perhaps we are doomed to suicidal nihilism. But Nietzsche's thought is not one-dimensional. While the risks of revaluation are real, they are not insuperable. Infection is exceedingly dangerous, but it is also necessary for elevation. The task of revaluing values requires spiritual illness; without it, we are little better than animals, with no depth or substance. Even in the twilight of the idols, true excellence -and its concomitant political role -is possible. The higher man must walk a fine line, using his infection advantageously while avoiding the pitfalls of the disease. Only the mightiest can succeed, and even they might meet their doom. We should not be surprised that great individuals sometimes (if not regularly) fail in the end. Given the multitude of tribulations they face, we should instead be amazed that any achieve greatness at all. The politics of revaluation is necessary, but it is also an exceedingly treacherous business. The future is uncertain. We might succumb to the abyss of nihilism, but we might also redeem ourselves.
The future of our culture, then, is indeterminate. The means to overcome the crisis of decadence exist, but are uncertain. Nietzsche seemed unable to decide which course humanity would take, vacillating between bleak forecasts of doom and exuberant hope. What is certain is that a herculean effort -one that could burn out those who attempt itis needed if we are to have any prospect of an enhanced mankind. Nietzsche made such an effort, and the outcome of his attempt is pending.
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